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Chapter 4
A PACKAGE OF POLICIES TO PERMANENTLY
INCREASE OUTPUT WITHOUT INFLATION
4.1 The Macroeconomic Externality Problem.
The examination of MAP and equivalent TIPS has shown that
these incentive anti-inflation policies will not only stop
inflation, but also increase output, both in the short run and in
the long run.l It is desirable that an anti-inflation policy
also increases output, but MAP's and TIP's effects on output have
been examined merely to assure that stopping inflation would not
reduce output or be a drag on productivity.
But can we act more directly against high long-term levels
of unemployment and low levels of output? And can we use the
underlying principles used to design MAP to design appropriate
incentives to reduce other sources of macroeconomic harm? This
chapter attempts to apply these principles, first by identifying
specific macroeconomic externalities, and second by examining
policies that might internalize them.
At the beginning of the Reagan administration, the supply-
siders claimed that they could produce increased output along
with reduced inflation. But they failed to produce the good
results they claimed. Since then, new classicals have denied
'See Koford and Miller (1984), Colander and Koford (1983),
Pissarides (1984).that high unemployment or aggregate instability is a real problem
(Lucas 1986?), while new Keynesians have not yet developed a
model that shows clearly the macroeconomic problem or how to
reduce unemployment.' MAP and TIP do increase output, but they
are a rather indirect means of increasing
own direct justification as a solution to
and they might be misapplied if they were
increasing policies.1U
output: they have their
the inflation problem,
used as major Vtsupply-
The manner in which MAP and TIP increase output while
stopping inflation can give some insight into the internalization
of macroeconomic externalities. When one policy cures two ills,
it is worth examining how it works with some interest. MAP and
TIP increase supply by reducing externalities in the economy,
specifically by reducing firms' market power. Increased supply
comes about because for a firm with market power an incentive to
reduce price is also an incentive to increase quantity. It
follows that an incentive to increase quantity also tends to
reduce price. (In fact, as MAP is actually implemented, it looks
very much like an incentive to increase inputs and outputs.)3
2Some "growth hawks II have recently developed a theory of how
the economy could grow more rapidly over the long term, with more
investments in human capital, R&D, and infrastructure. This theory
has no short run solutions, however. See MIT Commission Report,
Scientific American.
3Miller, Koford and Schneider (1984) make that point: it is
a point that deserves further theoretical investigation. It is
examined also in Koford, Miller and Colander (1989). There is one
clear distinction between MAP and such an incentive: MAP creates
a rule assuring a stable price level: it is the effect of
government monetary policy that causes the value of MAP credits to
be positive, and so causes the incentive to increase the use ofFigure 4-l: Increased Output under the MAP Incentive
This underlying symmetry between incentive anti-inflation
plans and incentive supply-increasing policies can be shown
graphically. Figure 4-1 illustrates that MAP has both an anti-
inflation incentive and an output-increasing incentive. The
figure shows a typical firm's Marginal Cost (MC) and Demand (D)
curves, and the derived Marginal Revenue (MR) curve. The firm's
profit-maximizing price and output are at P, and go. Now, the
MAP system sets up a structure requiring a firm that increases
its price to purchase the right to do so. If we take the firm's
allowed price to be PO, then firms with a price higher than PO
must pay for that right, while firms with a price lower than PO
can sell the right to others. Effectively, that means that the
firm's Average Revenue (AR) is different from its price. (Absent
MAP, a firm's average revenue is of course the same as its
price). Beginning with a particular level of output, we
associate it with a particular price on the demand curve. Then
for that price, there will be either a receipt or outlay for the
MAP credits: it will be a receipt that increases AR for prices
below PO, and an outlay that reduces AR for prices above PO. The
difference between D and AR is proportional to the difference
inputs and sale of outputs.4
between D and PO.4 The firm will maximize profits according to
its new average revenue function AR, using the marginal revenue
function derived from that AR function MR (MAP).
We may consider the MAP incentive to increase output as the
result of this difference between D, the firm's demand curve, and
AR, the firm's average revenue under MAP. As MAP shifts a firm's
average revenue function from D to AR, it creates an incentive to
expand output. This can be seen by considering the relative
locations of the MR and MR (MAP) functions. AR has a flatter
slope than D, and it is above D for outputs associated with
prices less than P,; taking D and AR as approximately linear, MR
(MAP) is greater than MR for all outputs greater than qO/2. As
Figure 4-1 shows, the new MR (MAP) function equals MC at a
greater output than the old MR function. This shows in a simple
way that firms will increase output when they face a MAP
incentive.
The MAP incentive can also be considered as a subsidy to
output: the firm's marginal revenue is higher under MAP for the
relevant range of output, with the difference due to the MAP
credit revenues. (The MAP credits can also be shown as a
reduction in the firm's marginal cost.) It should also be clear
that a value-added TIP would have exactly the same results.
4 For an approximately linear demand function, D is rotated
counterclockwise to obtain AR, with the rotation proportional to
the MAP credit price.5
Figure 4-l also shows the difficulty that an inflation
incentive policy like MAP has in increasing output. A perfect
supply-increasing policy would provide just enough of an
incentive to increase output to q,. But policy makers know only
the original price and quantity, pO q,, which is insufficient
information to determine the correct incentive. MAP reduces the
degree of monopoly as it shifts the firm's average revenue -- at
the extreme, bringing price down to equal marginal cost. But it
brings price to marginal cost at the quantity where p,, equals
marginal cost, which is an excessive level of output. The
optimal price and quantity, pB and q,, are unknown, and so cannot
be used as the basis for a MAP policy to obtain the optimal level
of output?
To adopt an appropriate l"supply-increasing" policy, we must
first determine what causes reduced supply. That is, we must
identify the market failure or externality responsible for the
reduced output. Then policies may be found that would act
directly to reduce that externality.
Some economists claim that the only externalities of any
importance are those created by government. Policies singled out
are those that reduce labor's incentive to work, firms'
incentives to invest, and firms' and workers' incentives to use
an efficient labor market: policies that reduce firms' and
workers' ability to enter new industries and leave old declining
5This is a particularly large problem for former socialist




also singled out. The main disincentives to work
on workers and firms, and unemployment
Labor markets are made less efficient by unions,
which operate under rules established by law to support their
existence, by restrictions on the right to hire and fire (rules
banning race and sex discrimination), by the Social Security
system and by the minimum wage. Thus these critics consider that
most of the "welfare state" and anti-discrimination rules
adopted since the 1930s are externalities responsible for reduced
supply. These critics surely are partly correct: as a negative
side-effect of their positive goals, these policies do reduce
labor-market efficiency in most cases.' But there may be
offsetting policies that allow us to keep most of the welfare-
state policies, while greatly reducing their efficiency costs.
Such choices may be considered to make a tradeoff between
income support to some group that deserves support and an
efficiency loss due to the support.* Then a comparison can be
made among different policies that provide similar income support
to find the one with the lowest efficiency losses.
?n much of Europe, there are basically permanent *'social
security" payments to able-bodied workers who cannot find jobs;
these are a particularly strong disincentive to work that might
explain Europe's high unemployment rates.
' These policies have also been adopted by such highly
successful economies as the Japanese, French and German economies,
leaving a minor mystery of how these economies are able to succeed
despite the governmental handicaps.
'Atkinson and Stiglitz (198?) describe numerous policies in
these terms.7
Most macroeconomists believe that the private sector also
contains important externalities. Keynesians have emphasized the
failure of some prices to adjust, which causes multiplier
effects. As one sector of the economy gets out of equilibrium,
it causes spillover effects on the other sectors, which are then
thrown out of equilibrium as well. Keynes emphasized the failure
of interest rates to adjust; Keynesians have concentrated on the
failure of wage rates to adjust; and institutionalists have
emphasized the failure of industrial prices to adjust. New
Keynesians have emphasized the failure of markets to clear, and
the spillover effects associated with non-clearing markets.
4.2 Types of Macroeconomic Externalities
Macroeconomic externalities can be classified into two
distinct types, according to the nature of the market failure.
Unemployment is a temporary state, so that an externality based
upon going into, or out of, unemployment, is a dynamic
externality. It is based on the forces and incentives that cause
people to change from work to unemployment and back.
Unemployment compensation, as currently paid in the U.S., is thus
a dynamic externality. Models of a dynamic externality must
emphasize the forces causing movement into and out of that state.
Income taxation, on the other hand affects the more
permanent state of earning income, and so is a static
externality. While it discourages productive effort, it does not
necessarily encourage unemployment. Models of static externality8
can be based on standard static equilibrium, with static lVwedgesVt
between actual and optimal incentives.
Dynamic externalities seem to be associated with a
stochastic process or a search process, or a problem of gaining
information about a novel and changing environment. In contrast,
static harms seem to be caused by the standard static market
imperfections of traditional price theory.
While both sorts of externality can reduce economic well-
being, they show up in quite different ways. Unemployment is
considered bad, and it is a clear measured phenomenon that
everyone knows about. Encouraging unemployment will increase a
number that is considered a bad. Yet the actual harm from
increased unemployment may be quite small: one must compare the
potential benefits from people's search for new and better jobs
during unemployment.g On the other side of the coin, the harms
from excessive avoidance of income taxes -- working in less
productive untaxed occupations, too much leisure on the job --
are subtle, and often escape notice. For people who engage in
these activities, they are often a source of pride. Often they
are seen as a reward for cleverness or "beating the system" and
so people defend them politically and morally, despite their
' That is, unemployment is the result of an optimizing
process, and so the harm from deviations from the optimum is a
matter of second-order losses.roots in inefficiency."
9
Dynamic externalities can be divided into two categories as
well. Some depend upon a stable process that is at equilibrium,
such as the equilibrium level of search in a labor market.
Others depend upon the disequilibrium (dynamic equilibrium path)
nature of the process, such as the fluctuation in commodities
markets due to speculative activities (Ackley 1983).
What externalities are important, and what might be done
about them? To answer these questions, it would be best to have
a model of how the economy works, one with both micro and macro
elements. Unfortunately, there are currently (1991) a variety of
models that lead to fairly inconsistent conclusions. For static
theories, economist have models that describe specific parts of
the economy well, particularly in public finance. Computable
general equilibrium models give a rather complete static form
that permits solving accurately for the results of taxes and
subsidies in both individual sectors and the economy as a whole.
For dynamic theories, the situation is different. There are
numerous sectoral models and a few whole-economy models (e.g.
Cooper and John 1989) but these different models are not well
integrated into a complete model of the economy. Rather, they
"This is particularly true in former socialist countries, and
in highly taxed countries such as Sweden. Yet the same is seen in
the U.S. In 1983 Senator Kasten led a long and dramatic fight to
open a loophole that would allow wealthy people to illegally evade
income tax on interest income. He succeeded. (Piefer 1989) pp
556,591.explicitly model parts of the economy, while their




integrated into a complete model. Both the sectoral and whole-
economy models remain basically untested empirically, so a proper
integration of the various contradictory theories is not really
possible." These theories are quite different from the old
Keynesian and monetarist views, which still have their
proponents. Contrary to the earlier theories, New Keynesian
models invariably have a clear microeconomic foundation with some
source in individual optimizing. Thus, it is meaningful to
discuss optimizing and deviations from an aggregate efficient
outcome in these models.
The many New Keynesian models of specific sectors appear to
be mutually consistent, but this question remains open. It may
be that different sectors require different models, since a real
economy is extremely complex. Each may have some truth in its
limited sphere. The next section describes several of these
partial views, and examines the externalities that each implies.
Policies can then be found that might address the externalities
that each model finds important.
4.3 Five Externality Problems
I shall discuss five separate externality problems:
I1 These statements are not true of the New Classical models.
These models have been developed as complete systems, and they have
been explicitly and comprehensively tested empirically. However,
the empirical evidence rather strongly contradicts them.11
1) Static Tax and Spending Wedges
The best-known 1980s diagnosis of the US economy's ills was





accept the basic supply-side point.12 The basic
argument is that taxes and subsidies create a wedge
private and social returns from productive
As people follow the maximum private return, they
reduce society's welfare due to this wedge. When taxes and
subsidies are high, this effect can be devastating to an economy,
leading to massive evasion of taxes, black markets, and extreme
misuse of resources. Thus, policies that reduce these tax-
subsidy wedges will reduce inefficiency and increase output.
In our fundamental terms, these claimed inefficiencies are
static and basically partial-equilibrium externalities. Thus,
standard microeconomic tools can be used to evaluate them, and
jpropose policy solutions.
to
The personal income tax and the major payroll taxes are the
major sources of large static wedges in the U.S., followed by the
corporate income tax. It follows that reform of these taxes and
reduction in total taxation are the largest supply-side policy
available. The wedge can reach around 50% for middle-income
taxpayers, including the personal income tax of 31%, payroll
taxes of 16%, and state income taxes of perhaps 8%. (The wedge
exceeded 100% for some wealthy Swedes in the 1970s). The most
I2 However, many economists think that some supply siders have
taken completely untenable positions.12
clearly desirable policy is a uniform income or consumption tax.
This would still make a considerable difference, although the
1986 revision of the U.S. tax law carried the U.S. a long way
toward a uniform tax (Symposium on Tax Reform, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Summer 1987).13
But many incentive problems of a uniform tax remain.
Reducing the U.S. corporate profits tax's high marginal rates,
and moving the tax closer to true economic profits, is another
significant step. Reforming the treatment of capital gains and
of interest income to eliminate taxation purely due to the effect
of inflation appears to be the most important single way these
taxes could be improved.
But the most important and most controversial need is to
reduce overall taxation (and spending). To do this, citizens
need to be able to compare the costs and benefits of government
spending programs, and the political system must be organized so
that it will choose the optimal combination, paying attention to
both economic efficiency and political interests. Why might this
not be true now? Certainly economists have studied the benefits
and costs of all of the significant government spending policies.
The information is available that numerous (most?) government
I3 According to the articles in the symposium, a significant
disadvantage of the 1986 act is that it moved away from a
consumption tax toward an income tax (Aaron, p. 9). Yet overall,
the income tax was moved toward a considerably more efficient
system, with a broader base and fewer loopholes, and lower rates
(Pechman pp. 11, 18) Musgrave (pp. 59-71) describes the additional
changes in the personal and corporate income tax that would
increase economic efficiency.13
programs are larger and more expensive than the would optimally
be. What is the externality? The fundamental externality
problem appears to be political.
Specifically, it can be argued, following Olson (1965, 1982)
and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) that there is a tendency for
special interests to get their way over the general public.14
This is arguably an example of the public goods problem, with
lower spending being a public good. The argument relies on the
notion that while the benefits from government spending are
specific benefits to particular people--typically special-
interest projects--the costs in terms of higher taxes are
uniformly spread across the public. If this situation is
empirically valid, it is a legitimate macroeconomic externality
causing excessive government spending (and taxation). There is
little doubt that the margin of additional government spending is
special-interest spending, even though in principle government
spending should be for "the public good." It is less clear
whether taxation is on a uniform basis across the public, or
whether there are sufficient "special interest" tax concessions
that make the overall level of taxation into a matter of
individual benefits. Given the fairly uniform nature of the
current tax law, the tax system seems properly described by this
model.
14Buchanan and Tullock (1962) model this externality in terms
of special-interest coalitions favoring particular proposals.
"DistributionlV  or "pork-barrel" politics has just this property.14
Accepting the externality, what policies are available to
internalize it? The most direct policy solution is to provide a
political system that would compare the social costs and benefits
and evaluate them properly. This is a large and essentially
political task: the political externality will be tackled as the
last of the major externalities to be considered. But some
general comments about the political externality in spending can
be made. First, it is likely that the real problem of excessive
spending comes from an overall ideological mindset that favors
government spending, a mindset shared by the public, elites, and
politicians. Given this overall view that government action
should be seen as the solution to society's problems, it's not
surprising that there will be excessive spending if the view
isn't accurate. The 1980s have seen a world-wide trend toward
the view that there is too much government, and toward a gradual
cutting of government's size. So, maybe the political process
really is working as it should.
Second, public political debate has to be broad and
superficial, since it must be of some interest to the informed
public. Only specialists will pay attention to the details of
special-interest legislation. So it is inherent that there will
be too little general public attention to the special-interest
claims, and there will naturally be a bias in favor of such
spending. The farmers producing sugar will know all about the
policies to subsidize them, and will favor them strongly: the
general public will not know anything about the costs imposed on15
them. The port of Mobile will know all about the benefits of
having Navy ships home-ported there, but the public as a whole
will not even know of the policy, much less its costs.
Rather than develop a way to optimally internalize the
political externality, a more imeediate solution is to provide
either a direct, optimal solution, or an offsetting externality.
For the overall level of taxation, a direct, optimal solution
does not seem to be available. There is no clear "optimal level
of government spending." However, a direct connection between
taxation and spending does seem optimal. Either a simple
balanced budget rule, like Milton Friedman's proposed
constitutional amendment, or a more sophisticated rule such as
Laurence Seidmanls full-employment balanced budget rule, would
seem highly attractive. These rules allow for deficit spending
if it is supported by a high (2/3) majority, and that higher
majority implies a reverse externality against deficit
spending.l'
But the real need is an externality against spending.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) favor a high majority for passing
spending bills, as a way to increase the weight of those who
I5 Admittedly, the externality being addressed by these
policies is deficit spending, not excessive spending per se. The
rationale for including this rule is that deficit spending allows
for excessive spending without taking account of the costs of that
spending. The "flypaper effect" is also important: when a
spending program is begun, perhaps due to deficit spending, it
develops its own constituents and is difficult to stop. If a
program must fight against other worthy programs for survival, it
is much more difficult to start.16
prefer less spending. Alternatively, the President could be
given an item veto on budget line items. Either of these
proposals would require a constitutional amendment; the
discussion of this issue would reinforce opposition to excessive
spending. If one grants that there is excessive spending and
taxation due to a political externality, then these proposals are
desirable and reasonable. These policies restrain, not prohibit,
high spending and taxes - creating a reverse incentive to
internalize the current excessive level of federal spending.16
There are many socially harmful wedges on the spending and
regulatory side of the federal budget. These are generally much
smaller than the tax wedges, but in the aggregate they are
important. Farm policies, subsidies for water, housing,
transportation and many other projects, the subsidies in the
Social Security system, veterans' hospitals, and many others,
create incentives to waste scarce resources. Cutting overall
taxation and spending is at least an indirect means of getting
the incentives closer to balance. This is the problem of
distributive coalitions, described in Olson (1965, 1982). The
16There have been numerous tax revolts in U.S. states, in
Europe in New Zealand and in Australia. In each case, either a
government has been elected that promises to carry out retractment,
or a restrictive rule like California's Proposition 13 or
Massachusetts' 2112 has been passed. While the Gramm-Rudman law has
an effect somewhat like these restrictions, there doesn't seem to
be any way to impose such a rule on the U.S. Congress short of a
constitutional amendment. And such a rule on the level of spending
or of specific taxes seems extremely inflexible.17
core problem is special interest groups that develop, pass a
policy that favors them, and then come to rely upon government
aid. Legislators then come to rely on these interest groups for
support, and bureaucracies are established to cater to them.
This "iron triangle" problem is easy to describe, but effective
policies to break down such triangles across the board have not
been found, despite considerable effort. Instead, in practice,
antispending politicians and economists launch a series of
individual campaigns against particularly egregious interest
groups, and "good governmenttt groups try to reduce the interest
group's ability to buy legislators. The essential point about
these policies is that the externality is clearly political.
Everyone recognizes the economic harm, but the distribution of
political power permits the policies to continue.
Would it be possible to adopt a first-best policy towards
such spending (and regulatory) decisions, instead of these
partial, almost *'band-aid" solutions? A t@demand-revealing't
voting mechanism, which makes it impossible for voters to impose
externalities, would be an optimal policy (Mueller 1989, Tideman
and Tullock 1976). Such a rule would make it the best strategy
for all voters to state truthfully the benefits and costs of any
policy to them, allowing the government to add up costs and
benefits and put into effect only policies with benefits
exceeding costs.
A basically similar rule could be used for voting in
legislatures, although I suspect that the fundamental problem is18
the connection between citizen preferences and elected
representatives. Legislatures do a fairly good job of passing
laws and budgets that are responsive to the pressures citizens
and interest groups place on them (Weingast and Marshall 1988).
In the long run, a demand-revealing voting mechanism would be the
best procedure in principle but, so far, such mechanisms have not
been tried enough to be workable. Steps towards such a
mechanism, such as national referenda on taxation and spending,
or on specific projects, would be desirable as they connect
voters' decisions more closely with actual government actions.
So would fairer, but complex, voting systems like the single
transferable bal1ot.l' These issues are described further below
in the discussion of the fifth, political, externality.
2) Dynamic but stable externalities: The Labor Market
The second major externality to be considered is that of a
dynamic process that contains externalities. The major example
I'Taagepera and Shugart (1989) develop an excellent practical
theory of electoral systems. Their book gives many insights into
making changes in electoral systems to make them more responsive
to citizen preferences and better at encouraging citizens to think
about their choices.
One question they do not deal with is the design of referenda
on issues. Such public referenda are a step toward a demand-
revealing mechanism. In principle, in a system like California's
proposition system, the efficient outcome would be chosen. In that
system, multiple contradictory propositions are allowed, and the
proposition winning the highest positive vote becomes law. In a
competition between more and less efficient proposals and with the
ability to make side payments, some form of the highest value
proposal should be able to defeat any lower value proposal
unanimously.19
is the labor market. Here it is the private sector that causes
most of the large market failure, although government policies
help. Labor markets are rife with externalities, because they
are not even close to supply-and-demand auction markets.18
Workers do not face a continuously clearing auction market, where
supply equals demand. Rather they must go out and search for
potential jobs. Similarly, firms must search for workers. Too
much search and unemployment may occur, if, as some economists
have argued, some jobs are much better than othersI This might
be caused by union wages, or because some firms motivate
employees with above-normal wages. Or it could be an equilibrium
pattern in search markets. When there are some very good jobs,
workers search excessively for them, as in a game of musical
chairs. Even though the search is not very socially productive -
- a person qualified for the position is easily found -- workers
search hard, and wait for a possible good job to open up. That
creates an externality: in effect, each searching worker is
trying to take the good opportunity from the others. If they
could all agree to search less, they would all be better off."
Firms go through the same search process. They know that
some workers are better than others, for a given job, and so they
"See ttOrganizations and Economics11  Symposium, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Spring 1991, for a good review.
lgSee Katz, Stiglitz, Pissarides (1990), for a discussion of
such models.
"See Pissarides, ---- JMCB 1988, (1990, Ch. 7 and 8).20
try to identify the best worker, hiring that worker before some
of the other firm does so. Each firm, by being "selectiveI
tries to impose costs on other firms who will end up with the
less qualified workers.
This process creates excessive search unemployment. (Some
other externalities tend toward too little unemployment: see
Pissarides 1988). There is another problem, too. With everyone
trying to find the best opportunity, it is hard for the people in
the market to know what a reasonable wage might be.'l People
could potentially make considerable errors in choosing their
reservation wages, although in long-run equilibrium they should
be fairly accurate. However, when conditions change, the market
adjusts to those conditions only by fits and starts -- often
leaving many workers unemployed for long periods when conditions
worsen." Firms act independently and their separate decisions
to lay off workers tend to reinforce other firms' decisions,
causing a vicious circle. So the labor market is unstable,
causing large swings in employment and output that are not
required by any underlying conditions.
The problem of high unemployment in subgroups of the
population, particularly the young and the less-skilled, seems
'lThis is the signal-jamming problem. Everyone is trying to
provide the same, desirable, signal. But everyone's signal
degrades everyone else's signal.
"This is because firms were at a profit-maximum, so errors in
their optimization cause only small, *'second-order" losses (Akerlof
198_).21
probably to be a case of the larger search model. Such people
may have unrealistic expectations about their chance of obtaining
a job that lead them to have high reservation wages. They may
also not realize the benefit of a good work record in obtaining
better jobs in the future. Without much successful job search,
they may have an intrinsically poor idea of how to set
reservation wages. All of this suggests that information about
the labor market is a public good. This is the case in that (1)
employers and workers could make mutually advantageous trades, if
they had accurate information: (2) the information is available
only from the aggregate of firms and workers, and it is more or
less equally valuable to all workers and firms; (3) no one has
the incentive to obtain and transmit this information. Given
that workers seem to be overly optimistic about their prospects,
there is a market externality problem caused by the failure to
provide this public good.23
What policies might reduce the harm from these market
failures? Creating a more efficient labor market seems one
solution. Since the problem is the lack of a public good of an
efficient market, a large organization that could provide that
23 A closely related public good is organizing a local labor
market so that workers can easily find and get to jobs.
Construction workers have long had union hiring halls that organize
such information and have a central meeting place. Less-skilled
workers could use such a facility. In addition, many firms
organize shared transportation to work for workers who face high
costs of transportation. These are also a public good for the
workers and possibly for groups of firms.public good seems
state governments
22
reasonable.24 For example, the federal and
and private firms could create a series of
clearing-houses of job information -- ones that would give
workers much clearer information as to what jobs were available,
and give firms information as to what workers were available and
their qualities. An effective market would provide both workers
and firms with a better idea of the opportunities available --
what the market supplies and demands were, and what the overall
distribution of opportunities was. That might greatly reduce
excessive search and llwaitingV1 based upon erroneous premises
about the market. Perhaps an agency jointly controlled by firms,
workers, and state government might be appropriate - one that
created a good incentive for firms and workers to register their
demands and offers. Sweden has been the leader in developing
24 Economists will naturally think of the labor market for
economists, which is centrally organized and seems guite efficient.
At the same time, it is basically voluntary and quite flexible:
most of its elements are determined by the independent decisions
of employers and workers, taking into account others' decisions and
the general nature of the market.23
such active job clearing-houses.25
An alternative approach is to create increased demand
pressure in the market: to suck workers into jobs. There is good
evidence that such demand pressure brings previously discouraged
workers into the labor market, and so seems to act in the same
direction as an optimal policy (See Case and Katz 1991, Osterman
1991). On the other hand, it is important to avoid excessive
demand pressure: yet due to search externalities (and
monopolization externalities, discussed below)
there is excessive search unemployment without
increase demand pressure.
The MAP and TIP policies can increase the
it is clear that
a policy to
equilibrium level
of demand pressure: since they keep the price level constant,
they let the government run an expansionary aggregate demand
policy, within limits. Therefore, unemployment can be reduced
somewhat by stimulating demand. In this way, the labor market
can be brought to the optimal level of unemployment, if that
level can be determined.
25Why has the U.S. government's employment service been such
a failure? One fundamental reason is that it does not need to
respond to the needs of either firms or workers. A consortium of
firms, unions and the government with contributions from each would
seem more likely to devise an efficient way to match workers and
firms.
The second reason is that government agencies face
bureaucratic restrictions that force them to be llfairtt to all. Yet
sometimes workers (and firms) need to be told that they are out of
line or unreasonable, and sometimes they need to be coached on
strategies that cannot be communicated in a bureaucratic way.
These two elements argue for a fundamentally private
organization with government support and an effort by firms and
government to assure that is is universal in its coverage.24
Weitzman (1984) proposed a novel form of labor contract that
may reduce labor market externalities. These contracts share the
firm's net revenues between the firm and the workers. The firm's
behavior is rather similar to that of a worker-owned firm, with
the major exception that the firm is still controlled by
management. A result that is important for our analysis is that
in bad times, workers automatically receive lower wages, rather
than being laid off and having to look for some other job. A
more controversial claim is that such firms have a strong
incentive to hire additional workers, since additional workers
divide up the workers' aggregate share.26 In Weitzman's share
economy, therefore, there is less incentive for layoffs, and so
quite likely less search unemployment.27
The government-established unemployment compensation system
is a significant source of externalities that increase
unemployment for both workers and employers. When workers
receive unemployment compensation, they are effectively receiving
a subsidy for being unemployed, which reduces their incentive to
return to work. Since the purpose of unemployment compensation
is to keep workers from facing hardship when laid off, not to
26 A share economy with search unemployment is more stable in
response to some shocks, but less stable in responding to others.
Overall, it should be more stable in responding to demand shocks,
Weitzman claims. Whether it reduces equilibrium
E&mployment is doubtful (Koford and Miller 1991).
search
It seems likely
that in a share economy with search unemployment due to
disequilibrium adjustment to demand shocks, there would be less
unemployment than in a wage economy.
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subsidize unemployment, a system that provided loans rather than
income to workers would be more efficient. It would reduce
hardship without reducing incentives and would eliminate the
externality.
Employers supposedly pay for the costs of the unemployment
compensation system according to the costs incurred by the
workers they have laid off. That would provide proper incentives
on an average-cost basis. But in practice, firms with the worst
layoff records pay only a fraction of the costs of the employees
they lay off, and the difference is made up by those with the
best records (Feldstein 197-). Requiring complete experience
rating (and so making costs related to layoffs) would reduce
firms' incentives to lay off employees, and so would reduce
turnover and unemployment. One way to obtain valid experience
rating would be to require that part of the costs of unemployment
insurance be either paid directly by the firm, or be covered by
private co-insurance by independent insurance firms. Even if
only 10% or 20% of the cost were privately incurred, that would
provide the critical element of information as to the true
expected costs of paying unemployment insurance claims. If
employees received mostly loans when they were laid off, the cost
of unemployment compensation would be greatly reduced, reducing
the unemployment compensation tax wedge. Some of the savings
might be applied to the public goods of retraining, job search in
other regions, and to temporary compensation to workers who must
settle for permanently lower wages. The search unemployment26
externality means that it makes sense for the unemployment
compensation system to @Utaxtl firms and workers for their
behavior, so that the system should make a net profit.
Another approach to the problem of keeping the unemployed
out of poverty while not subsidizing unemployment is to provide
unemployment compensation in exchange for some form of effort.
Colander (1985) argues for a system of workshops in which the
unemployed can do lNworktt that takes effort but may not be
productive. I favor giving the unemployed the alternative of
training or studying; that is strenuous too, and could raise
workers' productivity. Since one worker's higher productivity
raises others productivity, this helps close an externality in
which workers under-invest in their own skills.
3) The third externality is a dynamic or stochastic
disequilibrium: it occurs in markets where these is considerable
search, and the market is often in disequilibrium.
cases are asset markets, where short-run decisions





Economic theory implies that long-run factors should
determine prices for long-run assets, like stocks, bonds, oil,
and metals. This is the standard conclusion that the spot prices
for these assets should represent present values. Yet it appears
28 I am indebted to Hyman Minsky for conversations
issues, although he is not impressed with this approach.
on these27
that short-run factors actually dominate these markets.2g
Somehow, the near-term events can affect the long-term prices,
while the far-off events have little influence over the near-term
prices. The long term factors tend to be quite stable, so if
markets worked as economic theory says they should, then these
prices should be quite stable. Yet in practice, the prices
fluctuate more than economic theory implies, and -- more
important for our coucern -- they wander far from their
equilibrium values. Thus, there can be waves of optimism and
pessimism driven by this instability in the market.
This form of disequilibrium quite definitely occurs in the
financial markets. The evidence is strong that these markets -
stock and bonds primarily, but also commodity futures, foreign
exchange futures, and options in the underlying rights - are
highly unstable. The prices fluctuate far more than makes sense,
in terms of changes in the value of the underlying assets.30 The
same may be true of some commodity prices that have the same
nature as stock prices - energy prices, metal prices, and grain
prices (Ackley 1983). There seem to be two externalities in
these markets that cause the problems. The first is like the
2g For example, virtually all of the movement in these prices
seems to represent short-run factors, according the the approach
followed by Shiller. Long-term values change only modestly from
day to day, it would seem, but actual spot prices change constantly
and rather erratically.
30The controversy stirred up by this work seems to have been
decided in favor of the excess volatility view. See Shiller
(1984), and Stiglitz (197 ).28
greater-fool theory of stock market prices: the markets are
constructed so that the lucky, smart, and quick can get rich off
those who are less lucky, smart and quick. The person who
obtains correct information ahead of the next person can take
advantage of that information to the disadvantage of the others
in the market, even if there is no social gain from obtaining the





anyway. The result is that these markets are based
quicker than and outwitting others than on economic
And such markets tend to be unstable, as the effort
left behind pushes the prices up and down in spurts.
When stock and bond prices, commodities prices, and foreign
exchange prices fluctuate excessively, they increase instability
for the rest of the economy, where agents must make decisions
based on these prices. It seems that some booms and depressions
are driven largely by these fluctuations, although skeptics can
point to some stock market booms and collapses that did not have
any obvious macroeconomic repercussions. The Great Depression
seems to have been caused by such fluctuations, for example.
What policies might increase the stability of these prices, and
encourage more emphasis on the long run?
Economic theory implies that complete markets will be
31Keynes 1936, Hirshleifer 1976, DeLong, Summers et. al. 1990
are important papers along these lines, which has a long informal
history among financial practitioners.
32 This is not the same as Minsky's financial instability
theory, but it has similar conceptual roots.29
stable: the solution would be to encourage options, contracts for
future delivery, negative options, and negative futures. That,
in principle, should allow all information, current and far-off,
to influence prices appropriately. If firms were encouraged to
make long-run projections of returns, showing how they added up
to their estimated present value, that might increase the
markets' ability to act on long-term stock prospects.33 These
moves might reduce the problem. For instance, if next-quarter's
profits affect stocks unduly, creation of an instrument, based on
the stock's value one year off, allows one to pay attention only
to farther-off information. But it seems unlikely that these
added markets would be enough. The commodity futures markets
have considerable information available, and in principle there
is no reason why they should not respond adequately to long-run
concerns. Yet there is considerable evidence that they do not.34
Therefore, while encouraging long-run markets seems desirable
appropriate, it seems insufficient in practice.
A tentative theory seems necessary to try to rationalize
this difference between theory and reality. One explanation
might be that reality is just very complex in the far future,
that theories of that reality are quite difficult to develop.




33 Firms have recently been encouraged by the SEC to make such
projections, and many do so.
34 For example, -------- . It is not clear that this claim can
be strongly supported, or for that matter, strongly opposed.
[Check standard finance sources]stable because bond prices (and overall profits in a




possibilities that continually develop. This is a sort of large-
scale "peso problem.tt Possibly then while historical data show
fairly steady underlying values, people know that "anything can
happen" and see novel problems developing regularly. So, their
views of the long-run are quite unstable. Also, they have
largely short-run factors to evaluate, as evidence about the long
run factors.
A fundamental, but partial, solution to the problem of long-
run instability is to stabilize elements of the macroeconomy that
will in turn stabilize long-term contracts. One difference
between the modern economy and the economy of the nineteenth
century is the lack of really long-term contracts that exist
today. The forty year bonds and the consols of that era have
disappeared. The major reason seems to be inflation, which has
made their true value a bet on the long-run inflation rate.35
Thus, a policy that guaranteed the long-term price level might be
a stabilizing factor. A policy that provided a more stable long-
run gworth path would also be highly desirable in these terms,
although it would have much more important rationales, as
discussed below. In contrast, it seems unlikely that there are
macroeconomic policies available that could provide a
35 A secondary rate may be that the bonds of the nineteenth
century really were too long-term, and that changes in technology
and even the existence of nations are too uncertain for such
contracts.31
substantially more stable long-run growth path.
MAP helps deal with the instability problem by establishing
a long-term stable price that is guaranteed by a constitutional
mechanism. (This assumes that the MAP system is permanent, and
is understood to be permanent). MAP should therefore establish
that the price level will remain stable for the long-term. If
this policy is backed up by appropriate monetary policy, then
people will be more able to plan for the long term and make long-
term contracts. Contracts in nominal terms will be meaningful
for a longer period of time when prices are stable. MAP requires
that the monetary authorities carry out policies consistent with
price-level stability. So it is indirectly a way of establishing
price-level credibility, somewhat like the gold standard in a
previous era. After some experience with a stable price level,
and the confidence that the price level will remain confident,
one could expect an increase in long-run contracts and increased
credibility in long-term decisions.
Another proposed solution seems theoretically legitimate but
less sound in practice: to create large commodity stocks
maintained by government to reduce price fluctuations. (Some
countries have even tried to reduce fluctuations in stock market
prices by government price support programs!) Now there may be
insufficient incentive for the private sector to maintain
reserves, though that argument has not yet been clearly made. If
reserves are insufficient, some incentive - a subsidy, perhaps? -
to maintain reserves would seem to be the appropriate method to32
reduce the externality. The proposed solution of government-
controlled grain reserves following an efficient rule might be
theoretically valid, but it seems to be a very large-scale
intervention in the economy compared to the rather modest
benefits, according to Newbery and Stiglitz (1981).36
4) The fourth externality is closely related to the third:
it is the amplification of disequilibrium throughout the economy.
If a shock creates disequilibrium in some sector of the economy,
an optimal response would cause the shock to be quickly damped,
with the economy moving to its optimal new prices and quantities.
But modern capitalist economies have a tendency for shocks to
amplify, to build up large disequilibria, before the
disequilibria are eventually taken account of and dampened in
other sectors. To be sure, capitalist economies have very strong
stabilizing properties in the long run, but these properties seem
much less powerful in the short run, aside from the effect of
governmental built-in stabilizers. In large part, that is why we
have business cycles, which are a very unpleasant fact of life.37
36 Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) provide a comprehensive
discussion of optimal commodity stabilization schemes. The
political problems of operating such schemes seem very difficult,
given the efforts of political interest groups to manipulate prices
(Olson 1965, 1982). They are the fundamental barrier to efficient
schemes of this sort.
37 The Keynesian empirical models of the macroeconomy, such as
DRI's and the Wharton model, involve strong intersector elements
that are a major element in the amplification of shocks. See Evans
(1969). That is why multisector models were considered so
important for the Keynesian approach to macroeconomic modeling.33
Formal neoclassical models of intersectoral transmission of
shocks are developed in Cooper and John (1988), where they are
called "coordination failures II that lead to multiple equilibria
in a relatively static context. Lillien (198_) has been the main
new classical proponent of the view that intersectoral linkages
were the main source of macroeconomic instability.38 Cooper and
Haltiwanger (19 ) have examined intersectoral transmission of -
shocks empirically in a New Keynesian model of multiple
equilibria.
The externality involved here is not the intersectoral
transmission of shocks, since that occurs in an efficient
economy, but rather that some of the price or output consequences
of a change in one industry are not taken account of in the
prices set in markets. This is true of most markets, since while
prices tend to be spot prices, most industries have resources
that have made long-term committments. The problem becomes more
serious when the industries do not have flexible supply-demand
prices, but rather sticky prices.3g
An attractive potential solution to the amplification
problem would be to reduce the size of shocks, but while the
proposals in the preceding sections help do that, they cannot
38 Lillienls view is that these fluctuations are efficient.
3g While there are many good efficiency arguments for the
existence of sticky prices (Alchian and Allen 198-, Stiglitz 1987),
it is less clear that such prices are efficient when their
responses to shocks are included. A basic question is whether
shocks are cyclical and the markets are ergodic, or whether the
shocks are novel and the markets tend to shift permanently.34
eliminate the possibility of such large shocks as OPEC oil
shocks, Middle Eastern wars, or major changes in exchange rates.
A policy that should clearly reduce amplification is MAP, as its
"price level constitutiont' can assure aggregate price-level
stability.40 People know that whatever shocks occur, there will
be no inflation or deflation. That encourages long-term planning
and contracting, including such arrangements across markets.
Long-term plans and contracts reduce externalities, and so both
within-market and across-market externalities should be reduced.
As noted above, the price-level constitution also requires a
monetary constitution. The monetary authority would be required
to provide a money supply consistent with full employment at
stable prices. In the case of a choice between the goals, long-
run price-level stability would be preferred. To assure price-
level stability, the money supply must grow at a stable rate, in
accordance with the growth of the real economy and changes in
monetary technology.41 Since the monetary authority is also
supposed to maintain full employment, it should dampen any shocks
40Leijonhufvud  (1981) argues for a price-level constitution.
41 Active aggregate demand policy is assumed to be the
responsibility of the monetary authority, since fiscal policy has
not proved to be successful beyond automatic stabilizers. A stable
monetary policy targeted fundamentally on the price level and as
an intermediate target on a measure of the money supply should
prevent the monetary authority from causing business cycles by, for
example, targeting interest rates, as it has done in the past.
Changes in aggregate credit may be as important as aggregate money
supply, but policies to influence credit have not been important
in the U.S. (UK policies to control installment borrowing seem
quite inappropriate interferences with the market).35
from the real or international economies.
MAP will make it easier than at present to assure stable
growth, because MAP creates a t8constitutionalt'  stability for
elements of the macro-economy. Sstable growth in turn makes it
easier to assure price-level stability. Providing a long-term
suarantee of monetary policy by law gives more security than the
current non-binding statements by Fed chairman and the secret
meetings of the Open Market Committee (and equivalents in other
countries). MAP also gives the monetary authority an excellent
public signal, the price of MAP credits, should the authority
diverge from the optimal path. If the MAP credit price were to
increase, that is evidence of excessive demand, and the monetary
authority has then received a clear signal that it must change
policy, before anyone has to suffer inflation or deflation. Even
better, there will surely be futures and options markets in MAP
credits, so if people expect excessive demand in the future, the
futures and options market will show it.42 The monetary
authority can then take remedial action before the excessive
demand even shows itself. Under this monetary constitution, the
monetary authority is in a goldfish bowl. The monetary authority
might also be required to make long-term projections of how it
will provide additional money, which would be released to the
42This market could be erratic and speculative, like many
futures markets. But if experience with the gold standard and
British consols is relevant, such markets can be stabilized if the
monetary authorities pursue a consistent and stable long-term
policy.public.43 Its projections would then be carried out unless
made revised projections and released them to the public.




monetary analysis, and be subject to the courts for willful
failure to follow its legal charges or projections.44
There is no expectation that the aggregate economy will be
fully stabilized at full employment even with MAP. The policies
described in the earlier sections should bring the economy closer
to full employment on average, but not at all times. It is hard
to be confident whether policies to assure that output was at
full-employment levels at all times are appropriate - whether the
benefits would be sufficient to outweigh the substantial
administrative costs. A MAP-like mechanism that would accomplish
this is outlined in Koford, Miller and Colander (1989). It sets
aggregate output levels; then a market among firms allows them
to determine which will produce what share of the total.
Before recommending a quantity-based MAP, it is important to
examine the "real" sources of shocks. These are different from
43 Private firms, the Social Security system, and even the
Department of Defense are supposed to make long-term projections
based on current plans.
44 This proposal seems totally contrary to the tradition of
central banking, which involves secrecy and discretion. However,
while that tradition has many useful values, it may not be so
necessary in the modern world. The appropriate rules for central
banks may be better known now, and their actions certainly require
less secrecy than during the gold standard or pegged rate eras.
Accurate information from the central bank may now lead to social
coordination on a desirable equilibrium outcome.37
the shocks considered above, that did not stem from real sources.
While instabilities caused by these shocks might be reduced, real
policies are needed to reduce real shocks. Most are intrinsic to
flexible economies.
The international economy is the largest source of real
shocks in most modern economies. Flexible exchange rates have
not provided countries with the insulation from the world economy
that monetarists expected.45 And it is hard to think that
expansion of futures markets in foreign exchange will increase
stability very much. Those markets have grown enormously for 30
years and still remain quite erratic. The problem could be that
governments continually undertake destabilizing actions, and
speculators try to outguess them. Since government actions are
hard to forecast, speculators are likely to forecast a wide range
of possible future courses of action. As speculators try to
outguess each other, they amplify the instability, causing the
wide swings and excess volatility seen in the foreign exchange
market. Two related solutions seem possible, though they may be
visionary. The first solution is for all of the major developed
countries to adopt similar price-level constitutions. The
developed countries might all adopt some version of MAP with its
built-in price-level guarantee. The second solution is to
establish a common monetary standard, with a single monetary
authority that will assure price-level stability for the entire
45 As in Sohmen (1971); a review of the successes and failures
of flexible exchange rates is .38
developed world. MAP would be extremely helpful in putting such
a system into practice; in the early days of such a common
system different countries would have different inflationary
tendencies, but the MAP credit market would equalize those
pressures across countries. As the European Community moves to
adopt a common monetary rule with a single monetary authority, it
could use such a policy to reduce the difference in inflationary
tendencies.
A third and weaker alternative is that many countries might
have increased economic stability due to some combination of the
various stabilization policies. Something like this has occurred
in the European Community, where basically moral suasion and the
influence of the European Monetary System have increased the
stability and consistency of the different national economies.
Shocks that spread from one industry to another without
affecting aggregate demand (Lillien 198-) are an additional
problem. Such shocks begin, according to Lillien, because of
changes in tastes and technology: the computer industry grows,
and the copper industry declines or even collapses. Now, the use
of a MAP system reduces the amount of output adjustment that
firms make in response to shocks. But the basic reason that
shocks in one sector cause amplified shocks in other sectors is
price rigidity or stickiness throughout the economy. The sources
of that rigidity are in dispute, and no simple answer seems39
likely.46 But it is evident that price and wage rigidity exist,
and cannot just be willed away. Economists continually wonder
why contracts usually do not allow for price-adjustments in
accordance with changes in costs or demands. Perhaps MAP will
encourage such contracts. Since MAP makes it clear that
contracts in nominal terms are also in real terms, MAP allows
firms to write contracts more easily that adjust for real price
changes. It is also possible that many countries legal systems
do not permit contracts in which the price is contingent on other
prices.47 It is not clear, despite much research, why such
contracts do not commonly occur.
Wage contracts that allow adjustments in
are necessary if changes in employment due to
response to shocks
such shocks are to
be reduced to efficient levels. Wage rates are commonly adjusted
in proportion to the inflation rate, and firms with profit-
sharing schemes are providing the right basic sort of wage
flexibility. When a firm's profits rise, the reason must be due
to changes in costs or demand, and so the competitive wage should
also rise. When profits fall, so should the competitive wage
46See Stiglitz (1986) for a review of wage rigidity theories.
Akerlof and Yellen (1984) describe several different rigidity
theories. See the readings in Akerlof and Yellen (1989).
47 In the U.S., the gold clauses in contracts were voided by
law in the 193Os, and demand deposits in the U.S. cannot be
denominated in gold today. Contracts in many countries have been
tVadjustedlt by abolishing inflation adjustments, or adding
government-established adjustments. So, in an inflationary
environment, it is not possible to write an enforceable contract
because governments typically abrogate or modify such contracts.40
rate. Weitzman and former Senator Russell Long (through his
support of ESOPs) are both right in pushing for greater profit-
sharing, as a way of adding flexibility to firms' wage policies.
One important policy currently in existence needs to be
considered fully: a stabilizing, or balance-wheel government
fiscal policy. While such a system was not designed to be fully
optimal it seems to be highly successful. In recessions, taxes
fall and government expenditures rise. The process appears to
stabilize modern economies, in contrast to the lack of such a
balance-wheel policy before the New Deal. An approach like
Seidman's full-employment balanced budget rule seems attractive,
except for this element--that governments should run significant
deficits in recessions and surpluses in booms. The real question
is whether it is possible to determine how large these should be,
if the objective is to internalize the externalities of
macroeconomic instability.48
5) The fifth externality is monopolization, which may be
considered as a source of excessive unemployment and a source
of excessive local fluctuations in the economy. Monopolization
4* This is a difficult question that requires considerable
work. It is hard even to say what such instabilities are, and how
much of them are externalities: an explicitly dynamic
microeconomic framework is needed to solve for them, and the work
has not yet been done. The model would indicate the sticky prices
or quantities in the economy, and then examine the typical shocks
that would occur to the economy and follow their effect on the
environmenT',- iY-is 'h& passilrre-rb-W~?~~-'~~ &WLC~YTEZ~& LGtilZ~tit2C
because governments typically abrogate or modify such contracts.41
is essentially a source of our second form of externality:
dynamic but stable externalities. Firms have incentives to
create new monopolies, driving up prices in their industry and
forcing adjustments by everyone else in the economy. Now,
innovation has properties very similar to monopolization, and the
development of useful innovations is the main source of economic
growth (following Schumpeter). Nevertheless, when an innovator
creates a new product, and so has a short-run monopoly over its
production, the innovator can create substantial external harm on
others.*' In principle, the entire gains from the innovation
could come from creating external harm to others, thus creating a
The fashion industry is a mild example of harmful
externalities, as styles change regularly but no one claims that
the quality or usefulness of the clothes increases. Instead,
innovation consists of finding new styles that make the old
styles outmoded or old-fashioned, imposing a negative externality
upon the other firms and upon owners of the old clothes.5'
Something similar may occur in some academic fields, where fad
follows fad, but real progress seems elusive.
*'Colander (1976, 1983) investigates models of this process.
See also Koford (1986).
50 Hirshleifer (1971, 1976) develops models in which
innovations can reduce welfare, in a manner analogous to the
argument here.
51 Hemenway (1977) has an amusing model of this process.
Veblen and Leibenstein (195 ) are classic citations.42
Monopolization may be an important factor in the economy
because negative externalities are very common in innovation.
For example, audio tape decks and video tape recorders have been
popular largely because of their ability to appropriate
copyrighted material without paying for it. The introduction of
digital audio tape would have provided a way to make perfect
copies of recordings. Its economic viability lay solely in the
ability to make copies without paying for them, so it was a
perfect example of the innovation whose sole function is as a
negative externality. Automobiles and trucks provide a means to
impose upon government the cost of streets and highways, from
each owner's point of view. One wonders if automobiles and
trucks would have come to dominate urban transportation if their
users had to pay the full cost of their operation, including
highways, city streets, and parking spaces, and the costs of
delay and congestion.52 Much of the revolution in medicine and
biotechnology comes from exploitation of insurance rules that
allow the costs of treatment to be imposed upon others.
A simply stated, but difficult to apply solution, is to
establish more precise property rights, and to defend property
rights more effectively.53 Then the incentive to do well by
taking from others will be reduced, and perhaps the incentive to
Q A factor in the decline of the Los Angeles interurban
railway system was that the transit trains became stuck in
automobile traffic at intersections, causing delays.
53See Eggertsson (1990) for references on property rights
theory.43
do well by increasing social value will be increased.
Interestingly, MAP and TIP incorporate a different solution
by sharing gains and losses from innovation, which corrects for
some instability created by monopolization. That occurs because
some of the external costs are those of quickly adjusting to a
new, unexpected situation that makes one worse off, and other
external costs are those of entering the newly monopolized
industry to try to capture some of the monopoly rents. These
costs are reduced if the benefits of adjusting are reduced by
making the profit gradient less steep.54
6) The previous types of externalities were based on
economic rather than political problems and solutions, but it
often turned out that the economic solutions were needed to
correct for political failures. The U.S. political system is
rife with externalities and market failures that prevent timely
consideration of issues, and allow the overall public interest to
be ignored. (Other democratic systems are hardly perfect
either). Making democratic government less a source of
externalities is thus as important as all of the other policies.
54See Colander (1984) and Koford (1985). This point has not
yet been fully worked out, at least by us. For example, the full
dynamic path of prices should be modeled, and we have not done
that.
It is also worth noting that any profits tax has this
consequence.
Related analysis of monopolization is found in the literature
on externalities in games of innovation and R&D, and patent races.
See in the Handbook of Industrial Organization.Majority rule allows a majority can impose external costs upon a
minority; when one majority is beaten by another, which in turn
44
is beaten by another, everyone is imposing externalities upon
others, and finding that others are imposing externalities upon
them. To block tyrannical majorities, the system has processes
of delay, in the form of
of any policy costly and
checks and balances, that make passage
difficult. Nevertheless, special
interests have ways of passing their favored legislation (Olson
1965). Over time these special-interest laws accumulate and
gradually cause the economy to decline (Olson 1982).
A system without externalities can be devised; it simply
would prevent the imposition of externalities upon the losing
side. This would also make it easier to put policies with high
value to the public into effect. Such democratic procedures, the
"demand-revealing processes, )I have been known theoretically for
two decades.55 It is time to consider putting them into effect.
More effective constitutional rules will help solve the previous
four problems by allowing the government to find and adopt better
policies.
A path to such rules can be found through the use of public
referenda on many issues. Such referenda could use versions of
demand-revealing. (It is important to see if there are simple,
approximately incentive-compatible mechanisms that could be
%ee Tideman and Tullock (1977), Mueller (1989). Hayek's
(1960) proposals for an effective tlconstitution of liberty" are
less formally sophisticated, but perhaps more complete and with an
element of wisdom.45
introduced to current referenda.) Additional issues, currently
considered only by the central government, could be subject to
ratification by a referendum. And voting in legislatures could
also be changed to a Itpoint voting" system that was based on
demand-revealing or similar systems such as Mueller's voting by
veto.
The other route to efficient government is through a
constitution limiting government action. Just as one solution to
the externality problem is to assure a particular outcome such as
stable prices, one solution to the political externality problem
is to assure a particular outcome. A variety of forms of rent-
seeking can be prohibited by constitutional rule--as, for
instance, internal tariffs are prohibited in the U.S. Hayek
(1960) describes such a constitutional society. A basic element
of such constitutional rules is to prohibit government
interventions into some areas of the economy. Thus, it would be
necessary to separate out proper government functions from ones
not appropriately carried out by government. Further progress
could be made, however, by dividing local and national concerns
by a clear federal structure. Then Tiebout competition would
improve the efficiency of the local government decisions.
Democracy has always been seen as highly imperfect, only
superior to the alternative. Yet democracy is a social creation,
and the variety of democratic systems suggests that innovation is
as possible here as in the form of corporate incentive
structures. In addition, there are now lVoptimalll mechanisms and46
outcomes that can be compared with the actual institutions. It
seems appropriate to innovate in this area; and it is clear that
such innovations would reduce the political pressure to cause
economic harm.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there is currently available a
set of policies that can almost surely guarantee full employment
with stable prices. It is fairly clear that the policies
described are consistent and form a kind of self-reinforcing
llpackage." Methods to assure stable prices are fairly well known
in academic circles: the individual policies that can assure full
employment with high output, are also known to specialists.
It is fortunate that they make up an integrated package,
although economists have not recognized that the solutions to
some of the macroeconomic externalities are still only
speculative or tentative. But the combination of these policies
provides a whole greater than the sum of the parts. By using the
fundamental procedures of internalizing externalities,
particularly by creating new markets in rights when those are
missing, the "second-best" problem is avoided. We can move in
the direction of first-best solutions on many fronts at once.
And it seems that the policies proposed here represent a
comprehensive bundle of solutions to our previously most
intractable macroeconomic problems.
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